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Abstract
This paper studies the interconnectedness of banks in the syndicated loan market
as a major source of systemic risk. We develop a set of novel measures to describe
the "distance" (similarity) between two bankssyndicated loan portfolios and nd that
such distance explains how banks are interconnected in this market. As lead arrangers
choose to work with those that have a similar focus in terms of lending expertise, there
is a high propensity of bank lenders to concentrate syndicate partners rather than to
diversify them. We nd some evidence of potential benets of this behavior as to lower
costs of screening and monitoring, for example, higher shares of the loan taken by more
connected lenders and lower loan spreads if syndicated lenders are more connected.
Lastly, we nd that the most heavily interconnected lenders in the syndicated loan
market are also the greatest contributors to systemic risk, suggesting important negative
externalities associated with the syndication process.
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1 Introduction
In summer 2007, the global nancial system entered a crisis that became truly systemic
after Lehman Brothersdefault in September 2008. Since then, academics and regulators
have developed di¤erent concepts and proposals as to how to measure systemic risk, clas-
sify systemically important nancial institutions (SIFIs), and trace the determinants of
systemic risk.1 Two important measures of systemic risk are "Systemic Expected Shortfall"
(SES) developed in Acharya et al. (2010) and "CoVarR" in Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2010). Brunnermeier et al. (2011) analyze the determinants of systemic risk and identify
noninterest income as a main source of systemic risk.
One overlooked possible factor in explaining systemic risk is the propensity of bank
lenders to concentrate syndicate partners rather than to diversify them. Syndication is one
particular example as to how nancial institutions are interconnected. These networks are
benecial to the nancial system under normal conditions providing lenders the possibility
to diversify risks and borrowers access to a larger pool of capital. During crises, however,
this interconnectedness can lead to systemic risk if all banks hold similar portfolios and
might turn the failure of one institution into a full-blown systemic crisis.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke highlighted during his speech at the Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition in May 2010 in Chicago:
"We have initiated new e¤orts to better measure large institutionscounter-
party credit risk and interconnectedness, sensitivity to market risk, and funding
and liquidity exposures. These e¤orts will help us focus not only on risks to indi-
vidual rms, but also on concentrations of risk that may arise through common
exposures or sensitivity to common shocks. For example, we are now collecting
additional data in a manner that will allow for the more timely and consistent
measurement of individual bank and systemic exposures to syndicated corporate
loans."
1For example, the G-20 has just released the names of 29 globally systemic institutions that will be
required to hold an additional capital bu¤er. In Europe, regulators require 70 European banks to increase
their core capital ratio to 9% until June 2012 and hold a temporary capital bu¤er against additional write-
downs of their sovereign debt holdings.
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In this paper we study the issue by examining the organizational form of loan syndi-
cates.2 During the last decade, a fast growing literature has looked at various aspects of the
syndicated loan market.3 None of these papers, however, compares the portfolio holdings
of syndicate lenders and studies the implications of their interconnectedness, particularly
with respect to systemic risk. This is the main contribution of our paper.
We develop a set of novel measures to describe the "distance" (similarity) between two
bankssyndicated loan portfolios and explore how this distance relates to interconnected-
ness. Banksasset portfolios are inherently complex, which means that we cannot infer that
two banks are similar to each other because they both invest in the same industry or market.
The extent and depth of their investment matters, as well as other types of investments
and their relative weights. We thus focus on the similarity in lending expertise between two
banks in the syndicated loan market as data pertaining to this market are fairly complete
to provide us a comprehensive view of the banksentire loan portfolios. This is essential
to properly assess how distant/close the banks are along various dimensions such as in-
dustry specialization or physical market presence. Using DealScans loan origination data,
we compute banksportfolio weights based on loan amounts they arranged in each area
of specialization and measure the distance between two banks as the Euclidean distance
based on these portfolios weights.4 Such distance is a direct measure of interconnectedness:
the closer two banks are, the more similar their loan portfolios are, and thus, the higher
exposure they have to common shocks.
2Loan syndicates are ideal for the purpose of our paper. A syndicate consists of: (i) one or multiple lead
arrangers that are delegated to screen/monitor the borrower and administer the loan/syndicate, and (ii)
participant lenders whose main role is often just funding part of the loan. Lead arrangers choose whom to
invite to participate in the loan and may delegate certain tasks to the senior members of the syndicate, e.g.,
co-agents. Thus, loan syndicates provide rich content about the interrelationships among lenders.
3Among others, Chowdhry and Nanda (1996), Pichler and Wilhelm (2001), and Tykvová (2007) theo-
retically analyze the rationale for syndication and nd that syndicates are formed for reasons such as risk
sharing, knowledge transfer, and regulation circumventing. Empirical papers on syndicated loans have exam-
ined syndicate structure from the perspectives of information asymmetry [e.g., Lee and Mullineaux (2004),
Jones, Lang and Nigro (2005), and Su (2007)], lendersreputation [e.g., Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and
Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011)], and liquidity management [e.g., Gatev and Strahan (2009)]. The
e¤ect of information asymmetry and liquidity has also been studied in syndicated loan pricing [e.g., Gupta,
Singh and Zebedee (2008) and Ivashina (2009)].
4Giannetti and Yafeh (2009) also use the Euclidean distance, yet in a two-dimension space, to measure
cultural di¤erences between lead arrangers and borrowers and within member banks in loan syndicates.
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Using the distance measure, we rst analyze how banks connect with each other through
loan participation. More precisely, we study the e¤ect of distance on the syndicate struc-
ture. Do lead arrangers choose syndicate members that are more or less distant based on
their specializations in a borrowers industry as well as a borrowers geographic location?
Choosing close syndicate members can be benecial for e¢ ciency reasons. A lead arranger
can prot from other lendersdegree of specialization and delegate some of the syndicate
functions to them [e.g., François and Missonier-Piera (2007)] such that the cost of, for ex-
ample, screening and monitoring the borrower can be reduced. On the downside, however,
this strategy can also bring the corporate borrower and competing lenders closer together,
eventually at the cost of future lending business. Whether the costs outweigh the benets
is ultimately an empirical question that is addressed by the rst part of our paper. Over-
all, we nd strong evidence that lead arrangers choose lenders that are closer in terms of
specialization, i.e., those that are already more connected through similar loan portfolios as
lead arrangers themselves. It is an important result. Even though this behavior can benet
both syndicate lenders and borrowers under normal circumstances, it may as well create
negative externalities during crises as banks become more systemic. Our distance measure
is thus also an indirect measure of interconnectedness: the closer two banks are, the more
likely they will be involved with each others loan portfolio and thereafter become further
interconnected.
We then examine the possible reasons for and consequences of banks choosing close
syndicate members. Syndicate lenders can be broadly classied into three categories: (i) lead
arrangers or co-leads if multiple lead arrangers exist, (ii) co-agents, and (iii) participants.
While participants expand the pool of funds available for providing loans to borrowers, co-
leads and co-agents can be chosen to take on some administrative responsibilities. We nd
that lenders that are closer, more connected with the lead arrangers are more likely to be
given senior role functions in the syndicate, i.e., co-leads and co-agents. If responsibilities
are indeed delegated to these lenders, they have incentives to shirk on their screening and
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monitoring e¤ort [e.g., Holmstrom (1982), Diamond (1984), and Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997)].5 In order to ensure proper incentives to screen and monitor, they need to have
larger stakes in the loan. We nd that the loan share held by a syndicate lender increases
signicantly the closer it is to the lead arranger. These results are consistent with lead
arrangers delegating responsibilities among syndicate members. The incremental e¤ect of
distance between two banks on their collaboration over and above the e¤ects of prior bank-
borrower relationships provides another layer of understanding how banks collaborate in
the corporate loan market which, to the best of our knowledge, is new to the literature.6
Next, we ask how borrowers are a¤ected by the way banks are interconnected in the
syndicated loan market. To analyze this, we measure the impact of lender distance in the
syndicate on loan spread charged to the borrower.7 We nd that the net e¤ect of lender
distance on loan pricing is that the borrower is charged a lower loan spread if the syndicate
consists of lenders that are closer to one another in terms of specialization. This is consistent
with the interpretation that borrowers are able to internalize part of the benets from
lenderspotential collaboration on screening and/or monitoring. It provides further support
to the hypothesis that syndicate members close to lead arrangers can help reduce the overall
loan syndication costs. We also ask whether greater interconnectedness among syndicate
members, measured by lender distance, eventually reduces default rates. Interestingly, after
controlling for borrower quality and creditworthiness, we do not nd that the benets of
interconnectedness extend to loan default.
Lastly, we analyze the implication of concentrating syndicate lenders on systemic risk.
More specically, we ask whether banks that are strongly connected with other banks
as a result of this syndication process also contributed most to systemic risk during the
5Strausz (1997) argues that delegation is positive as it has both incentive and commitment e¤ects.
6We carefully control for prior relationships between banks as well as between borrowers and potential
lenders in our regressions as lead arrangers may choose participant lenders based on their familiarity with
borrowers when facing a high degree of information asymmetry [Su (2007)].
7Theoretically, the e¤ect may be ambiguous. On the one hand, a borrower might benet from savings in
screening and monitoring costs as the lead arranger delegates tasks to syndicate members that are similar
to itself. On the other hand, lenders that would initially compete for the same business might collude and
charge a higher spread to extract more rents from the borrower as described in Sharpe (1990) and Rajan
(1992).
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2007-2009 nancial crisis. Acharya et al. (2010) measure systemic risk as the amount by
which a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire nancial system is
undercapitalized, and they call this concept the systemic expected shortfall (SES). Dened
as the amount of equity capital a bank drops below its target value conditional on the
aggregate capital falling below a target value, SES can be explained by two factors: (i) the
marginal expected shortfall (MES) that measures the performance of the bank when the
market experiences its worst, for example, 5% days within a specic time period (that is,
the downside exposure of a bank to systemic shocks), and (ii) leverage (a more leveraged
bank has, ceteris paribus, a larger shortfall in a systemic crisis). The banks with the largest
capital shortfall are the greatest contributors to a nancial crisis. Acharya et al. (2010) and
Brownlees and Engle (2010) develop the systemic risk index SRISK%i which measures the
percentage contribution of bank i to the overall shortfall risk. Here, we relate distance,
which is our measure of interconnectedness, to MES and SRISK%i. We nd that based
onMES as of June 2007, which is before the crisis hit, a banks interconnectedness explains
a signicant portion of the variation in its shortfall risk. Moreover, we nd that banks with
the highest interconnectedness index as of 2007 are also the greatest contributors to the
capital shortfall during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. We then explore this
relationship in a multivariate setting using monthly SRISK% data over the period from
January 2000 to November 2011 and nd consistent results.
Taken together, syndication provides some benets to banks and rms. Supposedly,
banks can diversify their risks through syndication under normal conditions. However, our
analysis shows that the syndication process has increased interconnectedness of banks over
the last two decades. In other words, at the same time as banks diversify their individual
loan portfolios, overall risk is contained within this network, and the increasing intercon-
nectedness of banks has elevated the exposure of these banks to systemic shocks.
This article relates to the literature on systemic risk. Recent papers that proposed
measures of systemic risk are Acharya et al. (2010), Brunnermeier and Adrian (2010),
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Allen, Bali and Tang (2010), Billio et al. (2010), Brownlees and Engle (2010), Chan-Lau
(2010), Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2010), and Tarashev, Bori and Tsatsaronis (2010). There are
also papers analyzing factors that contribute to systemic risk. For example, Brunnermeier,
Dong and Palia (2011) nd that banksnoninterest income explains some of the variation
in their systemic risk proxies.
More broadly, our paper relates to the growing literature that studies networks in -
nancial markets.8 This literature analyzes, among others, contagion e¤ects [e.g., Allen and
Gale (2000)], interbank markets [e.g., Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000)], social networks
and investment decisions [e.g., Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2007)], and investment banking
networks [e.g., Morrison and Wilhelm (2007) and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007)].
Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the interconnectedness of banks in
commercial lending networks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we lay out our empirical methodology, in
particular, derive our measures of distance in specialization. Data are described in Section
3 with summary statistics for both our sample of syndicated loan facilities and various
distance measures. Sections 4-6 examines empirical results on how banks interconnect in
loan syndication, what the implications of such interconnectedness are, and how this relates
to systemic risk, respectively. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Empirical Methodology
In this section, we develop our key explanatory variables, distance measures, and how they
are used in the empirical analyses. First, we describe how distance is measured between two
banks based on lending specializations reected in their syndicated loan portfolios. Then,
we explain how lender distance is measured at the syndicated loan facility level and what
is the distance maintained by each lead arranger from its partners. Distance is viewed as
a direct measure of interconnectedness in this section, and we will show that it is also an
8See Allen and Babus (2008) for a survey.
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indirect measure of interconnectedness later.
2.1 Distance between Two Lenders
We focus our analyses on the U.S. syndicated loan market, that is, syndicated loans extended
to U.S. rms. Five proxies of specializations are employed to measure a banks lending
expertise in this market related to borrower industry and borrower geographic location.
More specically, we use the 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, the state
where the borrower is located, and the 3-digit borrower zip code to examine in which area(s)
each bank has heavily invested and thus possesses good knowledge.9, 10, 11 We then compute
the distance between two banks by quantifying the similarity of their loan portfolios. The
detailed construction of our distance measures is as follows.
First, based on DealScans loan origination data, we rank lead arrangers by the total
loan facility amount originated in the U.S. market during each of the years from 1988 to
2010.12 There are a total of 3,144 unique lead arranger-years. In order to make the data
and computations more manageable, we limit our interest to the top 100 lead arrangers of
each year who held an aggregated share of 99.7-100% of the total market.13 As a result, the
number of unique lead arranger-years is reduced to 1,708 in our study. Then, we compute
portfolio weights for each of the top 100 lead arrangers in each specialization category
(e.g., 2-digit borrower SIC industry). Let wi;j;t be the weight lead arranger i invests in
specialization (i.e., industry or location) j in year t. Note that for all pairs of i and t,
JP
j=1
wi;j;t = 1, where J is the number of industries or locations the lender can be specialized
9We also examine lendersconcentration in the 4-digit borrower SIC industry and nd similar results.
10The 3-digit zip code refers to the rst three digits of the U.S. zip code, which designate a sectional center
facility, the mail-sorting and -distribution center for an area. With the rst digit of the zip code representing
a group of U.S. states and the second and third digits together representing a region or a large city in that
group, these three digits combined pinpoint a more specic geographic location than states.
11Borrower geographic location is determined by the address of the borrowing rms headquarter. As
nancing decisions, especially those related to issuing large amounts of debt such as syndicated loans, are
made by a rms nance department typically located at its headquarter, it is reasonable to assume that
banks develop relationships with their clientsheadquarters instead of satellite o¢ ces at other locations.
12Loan amount is split equally over all lead arrangers for loans with multiple leads.
13According to Cai (2009), banks commonly rotate their roles as lead arrangers and participant lenders in
loan syndicates. Such reciprocal arrangements make it feasible to analyze the interrelationships among the
top 100 lead arrangers since they are also heavily involved in loan participation.
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in. For example, for the 2-digit borrower SIC industry, J can be as many as 100.
Next, we compute the distance between two banks (that are among the top 100 lead
arrangers) as the Euclidean distance between them in this J-dimension space.14 Let dm;n;t
be the distance between banks m and n in year t, where m 6= n. Then
dm;n;t =
vuut JX
j=1
(wm;j;t   wn;j;t)2. (1)
Appendix 1 provides examples on how to compute distance between two banks as spec-
ied in (1). We show computation of distance among three lead arrangers that have ranked
the top three since 2001 JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup. Two partic-
ular years are chosen here: the pre-crisis year of 2006 and the post-crisis year of 2010. We
can easily observe that Citigroup invested in a loan portfolio that was more similar to those
of JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America in 2010 compared to 2006, and consequently, its
distance from the other two top banks became smaller. However, it was not the case if we
look at how the distance between JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America changed during
the same period.
Appendix 2 summarizes the pairwise distance among the top ten lead arrangers in both
2006 and 2010. First, distance was in general smaller in 2010 compared to 2006. Second,
distance between a U.S. bank and a non-U.S. bank was often larger than between two U.S.
banks or between two non-U.S. banks.
Distance is dened such that the more similar two banksloan portfolios are, the closer
they are. With similar investments, banks are vulnerable to the same kinds of common
shocks. Thus, distance is a direct measure of interconnectedness.
We examine the e¤ect of this distance between two banks, dm;n;t, on: (i) the likelihood
of one bank being chosen as a syndicate member by the other, (ii) the frequency and depth
of the relationships between these two banks, and (iii) the loan share held by one bank who
takes a role, either as a co-lead, a co-agent, or a participant in the syndicate arranged by
14The Euclidean distance is the square root of the sum of the squared di¤erences in portfolio weights
across all dimensions of lending specializations.
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the other. Note that we use the distance in year t 1 to explain (i)-(iii) in year t. Empirical
results on (i) and (ii) are in Section 4 and (iii) in Section 5.2.
2.2 Lender Distance in Syndicated Loans
There is substantial variation as to how distant syndicate members are across di¤erent loans
in our sample. To analyze how this a¤ects loan pricing and borrower performance, we need
an overall measure for each syndicated loan facility. We compute the lender distance at the
loan facility level as follows.
Suppose that there are Xk pairs of lead arranger(s) and other members in syndicate k.
The lender distance for the loan is the average distance of these Xk pairs of lenders in the
previous year. Let Dk;t be the lender distance in syndicate k that is arranged in year t.
Then
Dk;t =
 
Xk
x=1
dmx ;nx ;t 1
!
Xk, (2)
where dmx ;nx ;t 1 denotes the distance between the xth pair of lead arranger (mx) and
syndicate member (nx) in year t  1, where mx 6= nx.
We use the lender distance in a loan syndicate, Dk;t, to dene whether it is a close or
distant syndicate (Section 5.1). Furthermore, we use Dk;t as a key explanatory variable for
the interest spread charged to the borrower (Section 5.3) and loan default (Section 5.4).
2.3 Distance Maintained by Lead Arrangers
Each lead arranger may choose its own optimal level of distance from all the other lenders
it works with via loan syndication. To see how such an implementation of distance relates
to a banks contribution and exposure to systemic risk, we compute the following measure
of distance maintained by the lead arranger.
Suppose that lead arranger i originated Yi;t syndicated loans during year t. The distance
maintained by the lead arranger in year t is the average distance for all these Yi;t loans. Let
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Li;t be the distance maintained by lead arranger i in year t. Then
Li;t =
0@Yi;tX
y=1
Dy;t
1A Yt. (3)
We discuss the relation between a banks systemic risk measures and the level of distance
the bank maintains as a lead arranger during year t, Li;t, in Section 6 where Li;t serves as
the interconnectedness index.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we rst briey describe our data sources. Then we provide summary sta-
tistics regarding lenders, borrowers, syndicated loan facilities, and the various distance
measures we developed above.
3.1 Data Sources
To analyze how banks collaborate in loan syndication networks, we construct a dataset of
syndicated loans in the U.S. market over the period of 1988 through July 2011 using four
data sources: DealScan, Compustat, New Generation Research Bankruptcy database, and
NYU V-Labs Systemic Risk database.15
3.1.1 Loan Data
Provided by Thomson Reuters LPC, DealScan is the primary data source on syndicated
loans with fairly complete coverage, especially in the U.S. market. We rst use borrower
and lender information between 1988 and 2010 to compute the distance measures between
any two top 100 lead arrangers within each year. We obtain detailed data on a sample of
69,805 syndicated loan facilities originated by the top 100 lead arrangers (of the prior year)
15The risk page of NYUs Volatility Laboratory (V-Lab) provides various risk measures of global nancial
institutions. The website can be found at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk.
10
for U.S. rms between 1989 and July 2011.16 We collect the following: (i) loan terms and
conditions such as loan amount, maturity, and pricing, (ii) information on the borrower such
as its sales, whether it is a private or public rm, and whether it has an S&P or Moodys
bond rating, and (iii) information on the lenders and their roles in the syndicate as well as
loans shares at origination.
Our analysis is conducted on the loan facility level, and all the lending institutions are
aggregated to their parent companies.
3.1.2 Firm Data and Chapter 11 Filings
In order to obtain richer nancial information on individual borrowing rms, we use Roberts
DealScan-Compustat Linking Database [Chava et al. (2008)] to match DealScan with Com-
pustat based on rm name, ticker, and location for borrowers that are public rms, have a
ticker, and/or have a credit rating.17 We are able to retrieve nancial data from Compustat
for 32,654 loan facilities (47% of the sample).
Bankruptcy data are compiled by New Generation Research. This database contains all
U.S. public companies that have $10 million or more in assets and have led for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection since 1988. Companies with assets over $50 million that have
had a default or an exchange o¤er at a substantial discount to face value are also included.
We consider a loan to default if the borrowing rm appears in this bankruptcy database
at a time while the loan is active, i.e., after the beginning date of the loan but before its
maturity date. The bankruptcy data are matched with DealScan rst through Compustat
based on rms6-digit CUSIP, i.e., the issuer code, and then directly based on rm name,
location, and industry if no match is found in the rst step. We are able to identify 2,140
incidents of default (6.4%) among 33,237 loans extended to public rms or rms that can
be matched in Compustat.
16At least one of the syndicate members other than the lead arranger was also among the top 100 lead
arrangers of the previous year.
17To supplement Roberts DealScan-Compustat Linking Database, we manually matched the two databases
to obtain information on new borrowers that entered the syndicated loan market since May 2011.
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3.1.3 Systemic Risk
We obtain information about the systemic risk contribution of our lenders to the nancial
system from NYU V-Labs Systemic Risk database. The database calculates various risk
measures for about 95 U.S. nancial rms including volatility and rm beta. More impor-
tantly, they construct systemic risk measures based on the theoretical analysis in Acharya
et al. (2010). Systemic risk is measured as the percentage contribution of each bank to the
overall capital shortfall during a systemic crisis. They are constructed based on a rms
downside exposure to shocks (marginal expected shortfall or MES) and a market value
based version of leverage. These measures are appealing as they rely on market data. Short
runMES are measured using volatility and correlation models, and simulations are used to
extrapolate short runMES to shortfalls in a crisis period based on the analysis in Brownlees
and Engle (2011).
3.2 Classications of Lender Roles
We classify lenders into three categories based on their roles provided in DealScan: (i)
lead arranger, (ii) co-agent, and (iii) participant lender.18 A lender is classied as a lead
arranger if its "LeadArrangerCredit" eld indicates "Yes." If no lead arranger is identied
using this approach, we dene a lender as a lead arranger if its "LenderRole" falls into the
following: administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, coordinating arranger, lead
arranger, lead bank, lead manager, mandated arranger, and mandated lead arranger.19 If
two or more lead arrangers are identied, they are then co-leads to one another.
We identify a lender as a co-agent if it is not in a lead position and its "LenderRole" falls
into the following: co-agent, co-arranger, co-lead arranger, co-lead manager, documentation
agent, managing agent, senior arranger, and syndications agent. In addition, a lender is
considered a co-agent if it is not a lead arranger based on the "LeadArrangerCredit" eld
but its "LenderRole" is in the list of titles for lead arrangers.
18See Standard & Poors A Guide to the Loan Market (2011) for descriptions of lender roles.
19The "LeadArrangerCredit" and "LenderRole" elds generate similar classications of lead arrangers.
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Lenders with neither lead nor co-agent roles are classied as participant lenders.
3.3 Summary Statistics
3.3.1 Loan and Borrower Characteristics
Table 1 presents the characteristics of lenders, borrowers and loans based on the 69,805
syndicated loan facilities in our sample. Panel A of Table 1 reports lead arranger charac-
teristics. We have 1,708 unique lead arranger-years. An average lead arranger has a market
share of 1.3% and arranges 53 loan facilities, which correspond to a total volume of $18.4
billion, during one year.
Panel B of Table 1 reports borrower characteristics. An average borrowing rm in
our sample has sales of $3.23 billion at loan closing. Sixty-ve percent had previously
borrowed from the syndicated loan market at least once, and the average number of previous
syndicated loans among all the borrowers is 3 loan facilities. Among borrowers whose rm
type is known, 38% are identied as private rms, whereas 24% are public rms without
bond ratings and 38% are public rms with bond ratings.20 Among borrowers who have
Compustat data available, the average book value of total assets is $12.3 billion, the average
book leverage ratio is 37%, the average earnings to assets ratio is 7%, and 55% have S&P
debt ratings of which 56% have an investment-grade rating.
Panel C of Table 1 shows characteristics of syndicated loan facilities in our sample. An
average syndicated loan facility has a size (loan amount) of $278 million and maturity of
49 months. The average interest spread on drawn funds is 224 basis points over LIBOR.
About one-third (31%) of the facilities are classied as term loans. On average, there are
7 lenders in one syndicate, and the lead arrangers retains 32% of the loan.21 The most
common reason for borrowing is working capital or corporate purposes (62%), followed by
20The rm type indicated in DealScan is the most current status for the borrower at the end of the sample
period and hence does not reect the change between public and private, nor between rated and unrated,
over time. Thus, we cross-check the rm type with Compustat data, i.e., whether a borrower can be found
in Compustat at the time the loan was originated and whether a credit rating was available then.
21The share retained by the lead arranger is available for only 16,529 loan facilities (24% of the sample).
Thus, there may be some sample selection bias in spite of the fact that this is a widely used variable in the
empirical literature on syndicated loans.
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acquisitions (24%), renancing (21%), and backup lines (7%).22 Default occurred in 6% of
the loan facilities in the sample.
3.3.2 Distance Measures
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the distance measures we described in section 2 across
the 5 specialization categories, i.e., the 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry,
borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code . Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the distance
between any two lenders that were among the top 100 lead arrangers in each year from
1988 to 2010, whereas Panel B and Panel C of Table 2 summarizes lender distance at
the syndicated loan facility level and distance maintained by lead arrangers each year,
respectively, from 1989 to 2011. A number of important points are worth making here.
First, based on the denition of Euclidean distance, all distance measures must lie within
the range of 0 to
p
2. Second, the average lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level
is in the range of 0.43-0.47 and the average distance maintained by lead arrangers is in the
range of 0.63-0.70, which are both smaller than the average distance between two randomly
selected lenders (a range of 0.84-0.90). This is consistent with banks intentionally choosing
syndicate members with similar lending expertise. Third, the standard deviations of these
distance measures 0.3 for distance between two randomly selected lenders and 0.2 at the
loan as well as lead arranger level imply that there is su¢ cient variation in the data for
empirical tests. Fourth, the distributions of distance measures across di¤erent specialization
categories are similar to one another, which indicates that our measures capture the distance
in a persistent way.
Figure 1 plots the time series of these various distance measures by year. Part A, Part
B, and Part C of Figure 1 again show distance between any two lenders, lender distance
at the loan level, and distance maintained by lead arrangers, respectively. The time-series
results indicate that in general distance has declined over time, that is, banks have become
increasingly interconnected: the most signicant drop occurring during 1993-1995 when
22A loan facility can state more than one purpose for borrowing.
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syndicated lending began to surge. There were also two small rises in lender distance
during 2001-2002 and 2007-2010. However, overall, the distance between any two randomly
selected lenders declined by 16-20% during our sample period, whereas lender distance
declined by 45-59% at the loan level and 35-45% at the lead arranger level. Interestingly,
after some increases in lender distance during the crisis period, there was another sharp
decrease in distance in the most recent year. It should be noted that given this time trend
displayed in our distance measures, we carefully control for year or loan facility xed e¤ects
in all our empirical tests.
4 Interconnectedness of Banks in Loan Markets
In this section, we show empirically that lead arrangers tend to invite to their syndicates
lenders that are closer to themselves in terms of specialization. They are also more likely
to give lenders more senior role functions in the syndicate, i.e., co-leads and co-agents, if
these lenders have a similar specialization focus. Furthermore, the closer two lenders are
in lending expertise, the more frequently they will collaborate, and the deeper the degree
of collaboration will be. Thus, smaller distance infers stronger interconnectedness through
more collaboration. This is over and above higher exposure to common shocks, and distance
hence can be viewed as an indirect measure of interconnectedness.
We rst examine whether banks choose close competitors, i.e. lenders with a similar
focus in lending, as syndicate partners. As outlined in the Introduction, choosing a close
competitor can have both negative e¤ects (e.g., increased competition for future business
with the same borrower) and positive e¤ects (e.g., screening and monitoring responsibilities
can be delegated to this chosen, similar lender). To understand the net e¤ect, we estimate
the following regression:
Memberm;n;k;t = +1dm;n;t 1+2RELLm;n;t 1+3RELBn;k+4MSn;t 1+F 0k+m;n;k;t,
(4)
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where the dependent variable Memberm;n;k;t is an indicator variable that equals one if lead
arranger m chooses lender n as a member in loan syndicate k that is originated in year t and
zero otherwise. The key independent variable dm;n;t 1 measures the distance between lead
arranger m and lender n in year t  1. RELLm;n;t 1 is a proxy for bank-bank relationships
and measured as the number of syndicated loans lead arranger m syndicated with lender
n prior to the current loan (no matter what roles the two lenders took). RELBn;k is a
proxy for bank-rm relationships and measured as the number of syndicated loans that
were made to the borrower prior to loan syndicate k in which lender n participated (no
matter what role it took). By including RELLm;n;t 1 and RELBn;k in the regression, we
control for the e¤ects of prior relationships between the two lenders and prior relationships
between the borrower and lender n on the construction of the syndicate, that is, who are
invited to join the syndicate. MSn;t 1 is the market share of lender n as a lead arranger
one year before the loan was issued, i.e., year t  1. We use MSn;t 1 to proxy for lender ns
reputation and market size or power. Fk is a vector of loan facility xed e¤ects, which are
included to rule out any facility-specic e¤ects, including the e¤ects from the borrower, the
lead arranger, the time trend in a particular year, and any loan characteristics. Standard
errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the year level. The regression size is
KP
k=1
Mk  (100  1) observations, where K is the total number of syndicated loan facilities
in the sample and Mk is the number of lead arrangers in syndicate k. The resulting sample
size is nearly 11 million pairs of lenders in unique loan facilities.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. Five types of distance measures are used
in Columns (I) to (V), based on the 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry,
borrower state, and the 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. In all regressions, our
distance measures show negative coe¢ cients that are signicant at the 1% level. That is,
the larger the distance in lending specialization between a lender and the lead arranger,
the smaller the likelihood that the lender is chosen as a syndicate member. In other words,
lead arrangers seek to collaborate with close competitors. Thus, our initial results support
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the view that lead arrangers structure syndicates in order to delegate some screening and
monitoring to other syndicate members. We also nd that a lenders prior relationships
with either the lead arranger (RELLm;n;t 1) or the borrower (RELBn;k) have signicantly
positive inuences on the likelihood of being chosen as a syndicate member. The e¤ect is
especially strong for prior lender-borrower relationships, which conrms the ndings in Su
(2007). Interestingly, lender ns previous-year market share (MSn;t 1) reduces its likelihood
to be included in the syndicate. This may imply a subtle balance in partner choice: banks
prefer to work with close competitors who they or the borrower worked with before and
who are not big enough to threaten future loan syndication business.23
We then analyze the e¤ect of distance on the depth of collaboration so as to seek
supporting evidence that lead arrangers collaborate to delegate screening and monitoring
responsibilities within the syndicate. We measure the depth of collaboration using the
syndicate role lenders are assigned to (typically by the lead arrangers). Based on the lender
role classications described in Section 3.2, we generate a discrete variable, Rolem;n;k;t, that
takes the value 0 if lender n is not a member of the syndicate, 1 if it is a participant, 2 if it
is a co-agent, and 3 if it is a co-lead. While pure participants only contribute capital to the
syndicate, more senior roles such as co-leads and co-agents often have managerial functions
within the syndicate. A higher number for Rolem;n;k;t can therefore be associated with a
greater depth of collaboration. To test this, we estimate the following regression model:
Rolem;n;k;t = +1 dm;n;t 1+2 RELLm;n;t 1+3 RELBn;k+4 MSn;t 1+F 0k+m;n;k;t.
(5)
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. We nd a signicantly negative rela-
tionship between distance and syndicated role depth at the 1% level. That is, the greater
the distance from the lead arranger in terms of lending specialization, the smaller the like-
23As a robustness check, we use probit and logit specications with the same independent variables except
loan facility xed e¤ects and nd the same distance e¤ect. A large number of xed e¤ects are inappropriate
for probit and logit specications due to concerns of the "incidental parameters problem" [e.g., Green (2004)].
The probit and logit results are available from the authors on request.
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lihood that a lender will be chosen as a senior member of the syndicate, consistent with the
view that lead arrangers structure their syndicates to delegate screening and monitoring
responsibilities to members with a similar focus and expertise in lending.24
We provide more evidence as to the importance of common lending expertise in Table
4, aggregating participation and syndicated role depth for each pair of lenders on a yearly
basis. We nd that the frequency and depth of lender relationships decreases in distance.
In other words, collaboration is more frequent and deeper among lenders that are more
similar in lending specializations.
Specically, Panel A of Table 4 estimates the following regression:
Freqm;n;t = + 1  dm;n;t 1 + 2  Freqm;n;t 1 + 3 MSn;t 1 + L0m + Y 0t + m;n;t, (6)
where Freqm;n;t is the number of times that lead arranger m chooses lender n in syndicates
it leads in year t (no matter what role lender n took) and dm;n;t 1 measures the distance
between lead arranger m and lender n in year t 1, which is our key independent variable of
interest. Freqm;n;t 1 is the lagged value of Freqm;n;t, included in the regression to control
for the relationships between lenders m and n in the previous year so that their current
collaboration is not a simple continuation of their prior relationships. MSn;t 1 is lender ns
previous-year market share as a lead arranger. Lm is a vector of lead arranger xed e¤ects
and Yt is a vector of year xed e¤ects. Note that prior lender-borrower relationships cannot
be controlled for in this regression as banks may collaborate on lending to more than one
borrower and the collaboration frequency variable is not borrower-specic. Regression (6)
includes approximately 100 (100  1)T observations, where T is the number of years in
the sample. The resulting sample size is close to 220,000 pairs of lenders over the sample
period of 1989-2011. The coe¢ cients on our distance measures across all ve specialization
categories are consistently negative and signicant at the 1% level. That is, the closer
24As a robustness check, we nd similar evidence based on ordered probit and logit specications, again
without loan facility xed e¤ects. The ordered probit and logit results are available from authors on request.
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two lenders are in terms of their lending specializations, the more frequently they work
together in loan syndication. In addition, the coe¢ cients on Freqm;n;t 1 and MSn;t 1 are
signicantly positive, which indicates a positive impact from these two variables on lender
collaboration.
Panel B of Table 4 estimates a similar regression with the dependent variable now
measuring the aggregate depth of relationships between two banks:
Depthm;n;t = + 1  dm;n;t 1 + 2 Depthm;n;t 1 + 3 MSn;t 1 + L0m + Y 0t + m;n;t, (7)
where Depthm;n;t is the depth of all the relationships between lead arranger m and lender
n in year t, computed as the sum of the ordinal variable, Rolem;n;k;t, for all the loans
originated by lead arranger m. That is, Depthm;n;t =
Km;tP
km=1
Rolem;n;km;t, where Km;t is the
number of loans originated by lead arranger m during year t. Recall that Rolem;n;k;t equals
0 if lender n is not a member of the syndicate km arranged by m, 1 if it is a participant, 2 if
it is a co-agent, and 3 if it is a co-lead. We regress the depth of relationships between lead
arranger m and lender n on their lagged distance as well as the previous-year relationship
depth between them (Depthm;n;t 1) and lender ns previous-year market share as a lead
arranger (MSn;t 1). Lead arranger and year xed e¤ects are also included in regression (7).
All coe¢ cients on our distance measures are signicantly negative at the 5% level or better.
That is, the closer two lenders are with respect to their lending expertise, the deeper their
collaboration in the syndicated loan market. In addition, the coe¢ cients on Depthm;n;t 1
and MSn;t 1 are again signicantly positive as expected.
One possible argument is that our distance e¤ect is driven by the size of large banks.
Large banks typically invest in more industries and/or locations, that is, they are more
diversied with regards to their loan portfolios. Consequently, on average the distance
between two large banks will be smaller than the distance between two smaller banks or the
distance between one large bank and one small bank. Thus, since large banks frequently
work with other large banks, some of our results may simply be driven by the mechanical
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e¤ects of bank size rather than the true organizational form of loan syndicates. To examine
this, we control for bank size by including each banks syndicated loan market share in the
regressions specied above. In addition, to further show that bank size is not a concern,
we exclude the top three to ten lead arrangers of each sample year from all regressions and
obtain qualitatively similar results.25 In other words, distance is an important factor when
banks choose partners, regardless of the bank size.
Taken together, we nd a propensity of bank lenders to concentrate syndicate partners
rather than to diversify them. In the next section, we provide evidence as to the benets
of this strategy.
5 E¢ ciency Gains in Screening and Monitoring
Section 4 provides important insights into how banks choose partners in loan syndicates.
The question still arises as to why the organizational structure matters. To address this
question, we examine in this section what di¤erent strategies mean to borrowers and lenders.
5.1 Close versus Distant Syndicates
A possible benet of inviting similar lenders in syndicates is e¢ ciency gains, for example,
with respect to screening and monitoring [Strausz (1997)]. To explore this, we rst use the
lender distance at the loan facility level [as dened in Equation (2)] to group our sample
of syndicated loans into close and distant syndicates. The sub-sample of close syndicates
consists of syndicates in which lender distance is below the median lender distance in the
originating year, whereas the sub-sample of distant syndicates consists of the remaining syn-
dicates, i.e., those with lender distance above the median. We then look into the di¤erences
between close and distant syndicates.26
Table 5 reports the mean di¤erences for key borrower and loan characteristics between
the two sub-samples, i.e., Close Distant. We nd that on average borrowers of close syn-
25Results are available from the authors on request.
26The main di¤erences remain qualitatively the same even if we split the sample into more groups.
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dicates are less likely to be private rms but more likely to be rated, have S&P investment-
grade ratings, have borrowed previously from the syndicated loan market, and show higher
sales at loan closing. In addition, close syndicates tend to have larger loan size, shorter ma-
turity, and fewer term loans. In other words, close syndicates seem to have safer borrowers
and safer loans. All these di¤erences are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, the average loan share retained by lead arrangers is about 0.4-1.7% lower
among close syndicates. The di¤erences are signicant at the 10% level or better across all
ve specialization categories except the 3-digit borrower zip code. With respects to loan
pricing and loan default rates, we nd that close syndicates: (1) o¤er on average lower
interest spreads on drawn funds over LIBOR by 15-35 basis points and (ii) result in a lower
default rate of 0.5-1.4% in all cases except measured by borrower state. These di¤erences
are signicant at the 5% level or better. Such results from bivariate tests are in general
consistent with e¢ ciency gains from screening and monitoring.
In Sections 5.2-5.4 below we examine the e¤ect of distance on syndicate structure, loan
pricing, and loan default in a more formal regression framework.
5.2 Distance and Syndicate Structure
If lead arrangers choose their syndicate partners to delegate some screening and monitoring
responsibilities, they must give these lenders incentives to fulll these tasks diligently. Such
incentives arise from the shares of a loan these lenders hold. The closer a lender is to the
lead arranger, the more likely it will be delegated responsibilities to, then the stronger the
need for incentives through a higher share of the loan. Thus, we expect that the distance
in specialization between a lead arranger and a syndicate lender is negatively related to
the share of the loan this lender holds. Consequently, we test the following empirical
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specication:
Sharem;n;k;t = +1 dm;n;t 1+2 RELLm;n;t 1+3 RELBn;k+4 MSn;t 1+F 0k+m;n;k;t,
(8)
where Sharem;n;k;t is the share of loan syndicate k held by lender n, and dm;n;t 1 measures
the distance between lead arranger m and lender n in year t  1. RELLm;n;t 1, RELBn;k,
MSn;t 1, and Fk are the same as dened in Equations (4) and (5) above. That is, we regress
loan share taken by lender n in syndicate k on its lagged distance from lead arranger m as
well as control variables such as lender ns prior relationships with lead arranger m and the
borrower, lender ns previous-year market share as a lead arranger itself, and loan facility
xed e¤ects. This regression includes close to 160,000 pairs of syndicate lenders on unique
loan facilities. Note that the e¤ect of distance on Sharem;n;k;t in Equation (8) is estimated
conditional on the fact that lender n is a member lender of the syndicate, i.e., was chosen
by the lead arranger. Based on our results in Section 4, this group of lenders are relatively
closer to the lead arranger compared to those who were not selected at all. Thus, variation
in distance among this particular group is smaller compared to the whole sample.
Table 6 shows results for our distance measures across ve specialization categories.
Having controlled for prior relationships (i.e., RELLm;n;t 1 and RELBn;k,) and lender
size/reputation (i.e., MSn;t 1), we nd that the coe¢ cients on our distance measures are
consistently negative and signicant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with
syndicate lenders holding signicantly larger loan shares if they have similar lending spe-
cializations as the lead arranger, i.e., distance is smaller. We also nd that a lenders loan
share more signicantly increases with its prior relationship with the borrower than with
the lead arranger. In addition, a lenders market share has a signicantly positive impact
on its loan share, which may be related to larger players in the market having more funds
to invest.
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5.3 Distance and Loan Pricing
There exist potentially two possible e¤ects of pricing from lender distance. First, borrowers
might benet from smaller lender distance because lead arrangers can pass on some savings
from screening and monitoring costs to borrowers. However, collaboration among close
competitors might also lead to extraction of rents (higher spreads) from borrowers. Our
bivariate tests show that close loan syndicates are associated with lower spreads, suggesting
that borrowers can internalize some of the e¢ ciency gains. To examine the net e¤ect of
distance on loan pricing more formally, we run the following regression:
Spreadk;l;s;t = + 1 Dk;t + 2L0l;t + 3M 0k + I 0s + Y 0t + k;l;s;t, (9)
where Spreadk;l;s;t is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds. As dened in Equa-
tion (2), Dk;t is the lender distance in syndicated loan k issued to borrower l. Ll;t is a vector
of borrower control variables as of year t, including whether borrower l is a private rm,
whether it has a publicly available rating, whether it has an S&P investment-grade rating,
the number of syndicated loan previously borrowed, and sales at closing. Mk is a vector
of loan control variables, including loan amount, maturity, whether it is a term loan, loan
purpose, and interest rate type (i.e., xed vs. oating). Is is a vector of borrower two-digit
SIC industry xed e¤ects and Yt is a vector of year xed e¤ects. The unit of observation is
a loan facility.
The results are reported in Table 7. Our distance measures are all positive and sig-
nicant at the 1% level except distance based on borrower state. Thus, on a net basis,
borrowers actually benet from working with close loan syndicates by paying lower loan
spreads. The saving is 7-13 basis points for a reduction of one standard deviation in lender
distance based on borrower industry and zip code. This result is consistent with lenders
sharing some benets from low lender distance with their borrowers. In addition, coe¢ -
cients on the other control variables show that (i) loan spreads decrease in loan amount
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and increase in maturity, (ii) loans are cheaper for borrowers with S&P investment-grade
ratings as well as higher sales, and (iii) term loans pay higher spreads of about 71 basis
points on average.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that close syndicate members
can help with screening and monitoring so as to reduce the overall loan syndication costs.
5.4 Distance and Loan Default
We next examine whether potential e¢ ciency gains from constructing close syndicates ex-
tend to lower default rates. We estimate the following regression:
Defaultk;l;s;t = + 1 Dk;t + 2L0l;t + 3M 0k + I 0s + Y 0t + k;l;s;t, (10)
where Defaultk;l;s;t is an indicator variable that equals one if the loan is in default and
zero otherwise. Ll;t, Mk, Is and Yt are the same control variables and xed e¤ects as in the
regression of loan interest spread [i.e., Equation (9)]. That is, we regress loan default on
lender distance, loan and borrower characteristics, and industry and year xed e¤ects. Since
the independent variables include whether the borrower is rated, whether its rating is of an
investment grade, and its sales at loan closing, we control for ex-ante borrower quality and
creditworthiness and hence the coe¢ cient on lender distance indicates the e¤ect of distance
on subsequent loan default. The regression is estimated at the loan facility level. Table 8
reports the regression results from a linear probability model. We nd no evidence that
closer distance reduces loan default rates.27
6 Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk
The previous sections demonstrate that the syndication process has made the loan portfolios
of banks increasingly similar over the last two decades. In other words, it increased the
27As a robustness check, we use probit and logit specications with the same independent variables and
nd no distance e¤ect on default rates. The probit and logit results are available from the authors on request.
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interconnectedness of banks that were active in the loan syndicate network. While there
are benets to syndication (some of which we have analyzed earlier in this paper), it also
creates systemic risk because problems of some banks can spread throughout this network
for di¤erent reasons: banks are exposed to each other, exposed to similar assets, and exposed
to the same type of investors who eventually run on some banks because of problems that
surfaced at other banks (and the inherent opaqueness of the banking sector).
In our empirical analysis, we follow the denition of systemic risk as outlined in Acharya
et al. (2010) as the contribution of each individual bank to the aggregate capital shortfall
during a systemic crisis when there is an aggregate shortage of capital in the nancial
sector. Systemic risk occurs if the nancial sector is undercapitalized because the reduction
in lending by one institution cannot be o¤set by other nancial institutions and might
cause a credit crunch. Acharya et al. (2010) measure systemic risk as the amount by
which a bank is undercapitalized in a systemic event in which the entire nancial system is
undercapitalized, and they term it the systemic expected shortfall or SES. This concept
is appealing as it uses market data that are readily available to regulators and market
participants. They show that SES is the banks level of undercapitalization assuming a
target leverage ratio (for example, 8%). They demonstrate that SES can be explained
by two factors. The rst is the ex-ante market-leverage ratio of the bank, and the second
captures the downside exposure to systemic shocks which they call the marginal expected
shortfall (MES). MES is the expected equity loss of one bank when the market declines
beyond a specic threshold over a given period. Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and
Engle (2010) develop a systemic risk index SRISK%i which is the capital shortfall of one
bank relative to the nancial sector. The concept is very intuitive. Suppose that k is the
prudential capital ratio, say 8%, Di;1 is rms i debt in period 1, and Wi;1 (Wi;2) is the
rms equity in period 1 (period 2). The expected capital shortfall of this rm in period 1
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is then
CSi;1 = E1 [k(Di;1 +Wi;2) Wi;2jCrisis] (11)
= kDi;1   (1  k)Wi;1MESi;1
The rm experiences a capital shortfall only if CSi;1 > 0, i.e.
SRISKi;1 = min(0; CSi;1) (12)
SRISK%i;1 =
SRISKi;1X
i
SRISKi;1
where SRISK% is the percentage version. MES is measured dynamically using asymmetric
GARCH models and DCC.
NYUs Volatility Laboratory (V-Lab) Global Systemic Risk Database ("SRISK") pro-
vides systemic risk measures for about 1,200 publicly traded nancial institutions worldwide.
We can match 53 of our top 100 lead arrangers to SRISK. Appendix 3 shows a list of these
institutions. Interestingly, 24 of these institutions are also part of the FSBs list of Global-
SIFIs which more stresses the interconnectedness of the global nancial institutions even in
the U.S. syndicated loan market.28
We start analyzing the impact of interconnectedness on systemic risk graphically using
the top lead arrangers as of June 2007. Forty international institutions were responsible
for 96% of the syndicated loan origination as of that date. Twenty-two of them were U.S.
rms, among which were Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Sterns. All three belonged
to the top 15 originators that year.
We analyze whether the distance maintained by a bank [as dened in Equation (3)] can
predict its contribution to the capital shortfall of the nancial sector during a systemic crisis.
We collect monthly SRISK%i measures from SRISK and calculate an average relative
shortfall measure for each bank during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. We
28The list of the Global-SIFIs can be accessed at http://www.nancialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
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plot this measure against our distance measure in Figure 2, of which Part A shows U.S.
nancial institutions, Part B shows European institutions, and Part C includes the full
sample. We nd that distance explains a major part of the variation of SRISK%i (R2 is
above 50%). As distance is our measure of interconnectedness, this is equivalent to say that
the most interconnected banks are also the greatest contributors to systemic risk.
In a next step, we test this interconnectedness-systemic risk relation in a multivariate
setting using monthly SRISK% data for the period from January 2000 to November 2011.
As not all rms survived the nancial crisis or had publicly traded equity throughout this
time period, the panel is unbalanced with 4,998 bank-month observations. Our depen-
dent variable is Ln [SRISK%] which is the natural logarithm of SRISK% to account for
the skewness of the variable. SRISK% is left censored at 0 and our sample has 1,506
left-censored observations. That is, Ln [SRISK%] is available for 3,492 bank-month obser-
vations.29 We construct an indicator variable European which equals 1 if the institution
is headquartered in Europe. To account for di¤erences between Europe and the U.S. we
introduce the interaction term Distance  European. We also include as control variables
(i) the natural logarithm of the quasi-market leverage ratio which is calculated as book total
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, scaled by market value of
equity, and (ii) the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Both leverage and market
value of equity come from SRISK. All regressions further include year-quarter xed e¤ects.
We assess the e¤ect of Distance on Ln [SRISK%] using OLS regressions. The results are
reported in Table 9.
Model (I) of Table 9 shows that more interconnected lenders contribute more to sys-
temic risk. The e¤ect is signicant at the 1% level and the R2 is 15.94%. In Models (II)
and (III), we introduce European and Distance  European. European nancial insti-
tutions have a higher systemic risk index. We control for leverage in Model (IV). As we
are interested in the change in the contribution to systemic risk of one bank relative to
29We perform additional robustness tests using SRISK% as dependent variable and tobit regressions
explicitly controlling for left-censoring at 0. All results remain unchanged.
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the other banks if interconnectedness changes, we estimate a between e¤ects model. The
results are reported in Model (V) of Table 9. The nature of the coe¢ cient on our distance
measure is unchanged. We then include Ln [market value] as control for bank size in Mod-
els (VI) and (VII). Due to high correlation between European and Ln [market value], we
exclude European and its interaction term with distance in these two models. The results
for distance, however, remain unchanged. We test di¤erent model specications introducing
interaction terms between European, Ln [leverage] and Ln [market value] to account for
the elevated correlation without any e¤ect on our results. We omit these tests for brevity.
Taken together, we nd strong supporting evidence to our conjecture that the most
interconnected banks are also the greatest contributor to systemic risk.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies interconnectedness of banks in the syndicated loan market as a major
source of systemic risk. We develop a set of novel measures to describe how banks are
interconnected based on the similarity of their loan portfolios. We use a dataset of newly
originated syndicated loans for the period from 1988 to July 2011 and analyze which banks
are invited to join the syndicates and how this is inuenced by their existing loan portfolios.
We nd a propensity of banks to concentrate syndicate lenders rather than to diversify them.
We analyze potential benets of this behavior and nd evidence consistent with the view
that close syndicate members can help with screening and monitoring so as to reduce the
overall loan syndication costs. More specically, we nd that lead arrangers assign more
responsibilities to banks they are already connected with and have these banks take on
higher shares of the loan as incentive. We also nd signicantly lower loan spreads for
closer syndicates, which suggest that cost savings exist and borrowers can internalize a
fraction of these savings.
Subsequently and more importantly, we analyze potential negative externalities asso-
ciated with syndication. Using data for the most systemically important lenders in this
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market, we nd that interconnectedness of banks can explain the downside exposure of
these banks to systemic shocks. Moreover, we nd that the most interconnected banks are
also the greatest contributors to systemic risk.
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Appendix 1: Examples of Computing Distance between Lead Arrangers
This appendix shows how distance is computed by examples. Distance between two lenders is measured
by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their specializations in
the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this appendix is based on 1-digit borrower SIC
industry. We show below the computation of such distance among JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America
(BAC), and Citigroup (C), which have been the top three lead arrangers since 2001. Panels A and B covers
the pre-crisis year of 2006 and post-crisis year of 2010, respectively.
A. Top Three Lead Arrangers in 2006 (Pre-crisis)
1-digit SIC JPM BAC C (JPM-BAC)2 (JPM-C)2 (BAC-C)2
Agriculture (0) 0.0288% 0.1695% 0.0000% 0.00000198 0.00000008 0.00000287
Construction (1) 7.4369% 10.0986% 5.0807% 0.00070846 0.00055518 0.00251795
Manufacturing (2) 16.2823% 10.2499% 15.6509% 0.00363902 0.00003987 0.00291710
Manufacturing (3) 12.4032% 13.0988% 19.6492% 0.00004840 0.00525054 0.00429076
Transportation (4) 12.2990% 12.0246% 20.1229% 0.00000753 0.00612126 0.00655812
Wholesale/Retail (5) 9.2723% 11.1839% 3.7299% 0.00036544 0.00307180 0.00555624
Finance (6) 29.1845% 30.7133% 18.4803% 0.00023371 0.01145801 0.01496453
Services (7) 7.2318% 6.1904% 11.2364% 0.00010845 0.00160371 0.00254622
Services (8) 5.8613% 6.2484% 5.9401% 0.00001499 0.00000062 0.00000951
Public Admin (9) 0.0000% 0.0226% 0.1096% 0.00000005 0.00000120 0.00000076
Total 100% 100% 100% 0.00512802 0.02810227 0.03936406
Distance: 0.07161021 0.16763731 0.19840379
B. Top Three Lead Arrangers in 2010 (Post-crisis)
1-digit SIC JPM BAC C (JPM-BAC)2 (JPM-C)2 (BAC-C)2
Agriculture (0) 0.0000% 0.5199% 0.0000% 0.00002703 0.00000000 0.00002703
Construction (1) 9.5212% 7.4029% 3.6260% 0.00044870 0.00347535 0.00142654
Manufacturing (2) 18.0379% 11.4444% 20.9279% 0.00434732 0.00083523 0.00899358
Manufacturing (3) 17.1886% 11.9594% 13.0201% 0.00273446 0.00173761 0.00011252
Transportation (4) 11.5772% 16.0003% 16.7372% 0.00195636 0.00266263 0.00005432
Wholesale/Retail (5) 10.6755% 12.1554% 8.9399% 0.00021899 0.00030126 0.00103394
Finance (6) 21.5120% 23.7368% 26.5538% 0.00049496 0.00254196 0.00079355
Services (7) 7.9820% 9.4324% 5.5891% 0.00021038 0.00057260 0.00147715
Services (8) 3.3892% 7.1262% 4.6060% 0.00139656 0.00014807 0.00063515
Public Admin (9) 0.1165% 0.2222% 0.0000% 0.00000112 0.00000136 0.00000494
Total 100% 100% 100% 0.01183589 0.01227608 0.01455872
Distance: 0.10879289 0.11079746 0.12065953
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Appendix 2: Distance among Top Ten Lead Arrangers
This appendix shows distance between any two top ten lead arrangers in the pre-crisis year of 2006 (Panel
A) and post-crisis year of 2010 (Panel B). Distance between two lenders is measured by their Euclidean
distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their specializations in the U.S. syndicated
loan market. Lender specialization in this appendix is based on 1-digit borrower SIC industry. The top ten
lead arrangers in 2006 were: JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Wachovia
Bank (WB), Credit Suisse (CSGN), Deutsche Bank (DB), Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Goldman Sachs
(GS), Barclays (BARC), and UBS (UBSN). The top ten lead arrangers in 2010 were: Bank of America
(BAC), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Citigroup (C), Wells Fargo (WFC), Barclays (BARC), BNP Paribas (BNP),
Deutsche Bank (DB), Credit Suisse (CSGN), Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), and PNC Bank (PNC).
A. Top Ten Lead Arrangers in 2006 (Pre-crisis)
JPM BAC C WB CSGN DB RBS GS BARC UBSN
JPM -
BAC 0.0716 -
C 0.1676 0.1984 -
WB 0.2186 0.2190 0.2091 -
CSGN 0.3466 0.3431 0.2890 0.2974 -
DB 0.1927 0.2128 0.1581 0.1496 0.2737 -
RBS 0.3604 0.4114 0.3200 0.3154 0.3627 0.2778 -
GS 0.2586 0.2804 0.1355 0.1624 0.2604 0.1723 0.2797 -
BARC 0.4421 0.4624 0.3466 0.3064 0.4642 0.3858 0.4048 0.2481 -
UBSN 0.3913 0.3772 0.3757 0.3648 0.1477 0.3767 0.4409 0.3555 0.5342 -
B. Top Ten Lead Arrangers in 2010 (Post-crisis)
BAC JPM C WFC BARC BNP DB CSGN RBS PNC
BAC -
JPM 0.1088 -
C 0.1207 0.1108 -
WFC 0.1245 0.1651 0.2039 -
BARC 0.2493 0.2731 0.2716 0.3012 -
BNP 0.4168 0.3997 0.4621 0.3530 0.4392 -
DB 0.2223 0.1822 0.1804 0.3010 0.1806 0.4492 -
CSGN 0.1807 0.2062 0.2320 0.2241 0.1368 0.4328 0.2017 -
RBS 0.2802 0.2777 0.2833 0.2895 0.1437 0.3700 0.2101 0.2113 -
PNC 0.1068 0.1223 0.1947 0.1421 0.2595 0.3736 0.2427 0.1750 0.2820 -
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Appendix 3: Financial Institutions with Systemic Risk Measures
This appendix lists the 53 nancial institutions available in NYUs Volatility Laboratory (V-
Lab) Global Systemic Risk Database ("SRISK") that provides systemic risk measures.
Financial Institution Ticker Financial Institution Ticker
1 Allied Irish Banks ALBK 28 Marshall & Ilsley MI
2 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentari BBVA 29 Merrill Lynch MER
3 Bank of America BAC 30 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 8306
4 Bank of Montreal BMO 31 Mizuho Financial Group 8411
5 Bank of New York Mellon BK 32 Morgan Stanley MS
6 Barclays BARC 33 National Bank of Canada NA
7 BB&T Corporation BBT 34 National City Corporation NCC
8 Bear Stearns BSC 35 Natixis KN
9 BNP Paribas BNP 36 Nordea Bank NDA
10 Capital One Financial COF 37 Northern Trust NTRS
11 CIT Group CIT 38 PNC Financial Services PNC
12 Citigroup C 39 Regions Financial RF
13 CNA Financial Corp CNA 40 Royal Bank of Canada RY
14 Commerzbank CBK 41 Royal Bank of Scotland RBS
15 Credit Agricole SA ACA 42 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken SEBA
16 Credit Suisse CSGN 43 Societe Generale GLE
17 Deutsche Bank DB 44 State Street STT
18 Fifth Third Bancorp FITB 45 Suntrust Banks STI
19 Goldman Sachs GS 46 Toronto-Dominion Bank TD
20 HSBC HSBA 47 UBS UBSN
21 Huntingtons Bancshares HBAN 48 UniCredit SpA UCG
22 ING Groep INGA 49 US Bancorp USB
23 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA ISP 50 Wachovia Bank WB
24 JPMorgan Chase JPM 51 Washington Mutual WM
25 Keycorp KEY 52 Wells Fargo WFC
26 Lehman Brothers LEH 53 Zions Bancorporation ZION
27 Lloyds Banking Group LLOY
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Figure 1: Time Series of Distance Measures
This gure shows the time series of various distance measures (by year). Distance between two lenders
is measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their spe-
cializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specializations are measured in 1-digit, 2-digit, and
3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code. Part A plots the mean distance
between any two lenders that were among the top 100 lead arrangers of each year from 1988 to 2010. Part B
shows the mean lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level, which is the average distance between
the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year, from 1989 to July 2011. Part
C shows the mean distance maintained by the lender, which is the average distance on the loan facility level
for all the loans arranged by the lender during the year, from 1989 to July 2011.
A. Distance between Two Lenders
(Based on 228,502 lender pair-years)
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Figure 1 (continued)
B. Lender Distance in Syndicated Loans
(Based on 69,805 loan facilities)
C. Distance Maintained by Lead Arrangers
(Based on 1,708 lead arranger-years)
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Figure 2: Distance and Systemic Risk
This gure shows the impact of interconnectedness on systemic risk among top lead arrangers as of 2007.
Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is measured by the distance the lead arranger maintained, which is
the average distance on the loan facility level for all the loans it arranged during the year. Distance used in
this gure is based on 1-digit borrower SIC industry. SRISK%, a systemic risk index, is the average relative
shortfall measure for each bank during the period from July 2007 to December 2008. During that period,
96% of the total amount of syndicated loans were originated by 40 global nancial institutions, of which 22
were U.S. rms, 13 European, and 5 Canadian or Asian. Part A plots SRISK% against distance maintained
by U.S. nancial institutions as of June 2007, Part B includes only European institutions, and Part C uses
the full sample of 40 nancial institutions.
A. U.S. Financial Institutions
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Figure 2 (continued)
B. European Financial Institutions
C. All Financial Institutions
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Syndicated Loan Facilities
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of syndicated loan facilities made to U.S. rms
between 1989 and July 2011. For each loan facility in the sample, at least one lead arranger and one other
syndicate member were among the top 100 lead arrangers one year prior to loan origination. Lead arrangers
are ranked by total loan facility amount originated, and loan amount is split equally over all lead arrangers
for loans with multiple leads. Panel A reports lead arranger characteristics based on 1,708 unique lead
arranger-years. Panels B and C report borrower and loan characteristics, respectively, based on 69,805 loan
facilities.
A. Lead Arranger Characteristics
(Based on 1,708 lead arranger-years)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Market share (%), previous year 1,708 1.29 3.63 0.01 0.17 2.52
# of loans as lead arranger 1,708 53 131 1 11 128
$ of loans as lead arranger ($mm) 1,708 18,400 64,400 100 1,760 35,500
B. Borrower Characteristics
(Based on 69,805 loan facilities)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
All Borrowers:
Sales at closing ($mm) 46,796 3,230 13,600 69 527 6,710
# of previous syndicated loans 69,805 2.65 4.32 0 1 7
Private rm indicator 56,950 0.38 0.49 0 0 1
Public, unrated rm indicator 56,950 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Public, rated rm indicator 56,950 0.38 0.48 0 0 1
Borrowers with Compustat data:
Total book assets ($mm) 31,473 12,290 71,575 158 1,229 16,624
Book leverage ratio 31,344 0.37 0.27 0.06 0.34 0.70
Earnings to assets ratio 29,767 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.07 0.16
S&P debt rating indicator 32,654 0.55 0.50 0 1 1
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Table 1 (continued)
C. Loan Characteristics
(Based on 69,805 loan facilities)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Syndicated loan terms:
Facility amount ($mm) 69,805 278 658 17 100 600
Maturity (months) 63,998 49 54 12 54 83
Spread on drawn funds (bps) 60,490 224 150 49 210 400
Term loan indicator 69,805 0.31 0.46 0 0 1
Syndicate structure:
# of lenders in the syndicate 69,805 7.20 7.34 2 5 16
# of lead arrangers in the syndicate 69,805 1.32 0.70 1 1 2
% retained by lead arranger(s) 16,529 31.71 21.59 9.2 25.71 60
Purpose of loan indicators:
Working capital/corporate 69,805 0.62 0.49 0 1 1
Renancing 69,805 0.21 0.41 0 0 1
Acquisitions 69,805 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Backup lines 69,805 0.07 0.26 0 0 0
Loan performance:
Loan default indicator 33,237 0.06 0.25 0 0 0
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Distance Measures
This table reports summary statistics of various distance measures. Distance between two lenders is
measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their special-
izations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Rows (I)-(V) compute distance in terms of lender specializations
in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respec-
tively, in all panels. Panel A summarizes distance between any two lenders that were among the top 100 lead
arrangers of each year between 1988 and 2010. Panel B shows lender distance at the syndicated loan facility
level, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the
previous year. Panel C shows distance maintained by the lender, which is the average distance on the loan
facility level for all the loans arranged by the lender during the year.
A. Distance between Two Lenders
(Based on 228,502 lender pair-years)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
(I) Distance in borrower 1-digit SIC 228,428 0.845 0.343 0.385 0.863 1.295
(II) Distance in borrower 2-digit SIC 228,428 0.897 0.311 0.455 0.943 1.285
(III) Distance in borrower 3-digit SIC 228,428 0.894 0.308 0.455 0.943 1.274
(IV) Distance in borrower state 228,396 0.903 0.322 0.444 0.953 1.337
(V) Distance in borrower 3-digit zip code 224,388 0.887 0.313 0.435 0.962 1.271
B. Lender Distance in Syndicated Loans
(Based on 69,805 loan facilities)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
(I) Distance in borrower 1-digit SIC 69,540 0.435 0.184 0.239 0.401 0.679
(II) Distance in borrower 2-digit SIC 69,540 0.447 0.186 0.249 0.409 0.698
(III) Distance in borrower 3-digit SIC 69,540 0.435 0.188 0.235 0.397 0.688
(IV) Distance in borrower state 69,540 0.469 0.188 0.266 0.435 0.717
(V) Distance in borrower 3-digit zip code 69,529 0.473 0.207 0.250 0.432 0.758
C. Distance Maintained by Lead Arrangers
(Based on 1,708 lead arranger-years)
N = Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
(I) Distance in borrower 1-digit SIC 1,705 0.635 0.219 0.390 0.598 0.946
(II) Distance in borrower 2-digit SIC 1,705 0.668 0.231 0.401 0.632 1.016
(III) Distance in borrower 3-digit SIC 1,705 0.663 0.236 0.392 0.621 1.020
(IV) Distance in borrower state 1,705 0.674 0.233 0.412 0.633 1.035
(V) Distance in borrower 3-digit zip code 1,702 0.703 0.248 0.410 0.671 1.065
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Table 3: E¤ect of Distance on Likelihood of
Being Chosen As A Syndicate Member
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender (that
was among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous year) being chosen as a syndicate member by the
lead arranger (that was also among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous year) to the distance between
the potential lender and the lead arranger. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the
potential lender is indeed a syndicate member (0 if no and 1 if yes) in Panel A and an ordinal variable for
the role of the potential lender in the syndicate (0 if non-member, 1 if participant, 2 if co-agent, and 3 if
co-lead) in Panel B. The independent variable of interest is the distance between the potential lender and the
lead arranger in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender
specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower
zip code, respectively. All regressions include loan facility xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for
clustering by year are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from
zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
A. Syndicate Member Indicator
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
Syndicate member indicator SIC SIC SIC Zip
Distance from lead arranger -0.064
(0.0029)
-0.068
(0.0035)
-0.067
(0.0035)
-0.063
(0.0038)
-0.046
(0.0024)
Previous relationships with lead 0.0003
(0.00004)
0.0003
(0.00004)
0.0003
(0.00004)
0.0003
(0.0004)
0.0003
(0.00004)
Previous relationships with borrower 0.087
(0.0057)
0.087
(0.0057)
0.087
(0.0057)
0.087
(0.0057)
0.087
(0.0057)
Market share, previous year -0.053
(0.0321)
-0.077
(0.0302)
-0.076
(0.0303)
-0.059
(0.0305)
-0.011
(0.0376)
N = 10,734,322 10,734,322 10,734,322 10,734,384 10,725,803
Adjusted R2 0.4096 0.4102 0.4101 0.4094 0.4072
B. Syndicate Role
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
Syndicate Role Depth SIC SIC SIC Zip
Distance from lead arranger -0.089
(0.0046)
-0.096
(0.0053)
-0.093
(0.0053)
-0.090
(0.0056)
-0.066
(0.0037)
Previous relationships with lead 0.0006
(0.00006)
0.0006
(0.00006)
0.0006
(0.00006)
0.0006
(0.00006)
0.0006
(0.00006)
Previous relationships with borrower 0.149
(0.0075)
0.148
(0.0075)
0.148
(0.0075)
0.148
(0.0075)
0.149
(0.0076)
Market share, previous year 0.309
(0.0647)
0.273
(0.0633)
0.276
(0.0640)
0.293
(0.0640)
0.362
(0.0716)
N = 10,734,322 10,734,322 10,734,322 10,734,384 10,725,803
Adjusted R2 0.4363 0.4367 0.4366 0.4363 0.4348
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Table 4: E¤ect of Distance on Frequency
and Depth of Relationships between Lenders
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating the frequency and depth of relationships
between two lenders (that were among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous year) to the distance between
them. The dependent variable is the frequency of being members in the same syndicate during one year in
Panel A and the depth of all these relationships (computed as the sum of an ordinal variable indicating 0 if
non-member, 1 if participant, 2 if co-agent, and 3 if co-lead over all syndicated loans originated during the
year) in Panel B. The independent variable of interest is the distance between the two lead arrangers in the
previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-
digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively.
All regressions include year and lead arranger xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering
by year are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from zero at
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
A. Frequency of Relationships between Lenders
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
Frequency of relationships SIC SIC SIC Zip
Distance from the other lead arranger -0.667
(0.1178)
-1.025
(0.1750)
-1.105
(0.1864)
-0.836
(0.1567)
-0.796
(0.1564)
Frequency of relationships, previous year 0.902
(0.0684)
0.901
(0.0684)
0.900
(0.0684)
0.901
(0.0684)
0.902
(0.0684)
Market share, previous year 5.603
(1.8517)
4.723
(1.7811)
4.511
(1.7650)
5.104
(1.8232)
5.235
(1.8070)
N = 228,428 228,428 228,428 228,340 224,386
Adjusted R2 0.8311 0.8312 0.8312 0.8311 0.8310
B. Depth of Relationships between Lenders
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
Depth of relationships SIC SIC SIC Zip
Distance from lead arranger -0.604
(0.2187)
-0.894
(0.3474)
-0.900
(0.3644)
-0.735
(0.2910)
-0.775
(0.2580)
Depth of relationships, previous year 1.572
(0.1162)
1.571
(0.1161)
1.571
(0.1161)
1,571
(0.1162)
1.571
(0.1161)
Market share, previous year 29.176
(6.4122)
28.449
(6.3151)
28.394
(6.3449)
28.770
(6.4105)
28.772
(6.4114)
N = 228,428 228,428 228,428 228,340 224,386
Adjusted R2 0.7842 0.7843 0.7843 0.7842 0.7842
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Table 5: Close versus Distant Syndicates
This table reports the mean di¤erences between close and distant syndicates on various borrower and
loan characteristics, that is, the mean of close syndicates minus the mean of distant syndicates (Close 
Distant). The sample of 69,805 syndicated loan facilities is split into two sub-samples based on the yearly
median of the lender distance at the loan level. The sub-sample of close syndicates consists of syndicates
in which lender distance is below the median of the originating year, whereas the sub-sample of distant
syndicates consists of the remaining syndicates. Lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level is
dened as the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the
previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit
borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. * indicates that the mean
di¤erence is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
SIC SIC SIC Zip
Borrowers characteristics:
Private rm indicator -0.057 -0.048 -0.052 -0.079 -0.061
Rated rm indicator 0.069 0.061 0.062 0.115 0.079
S&P investment-grade indicator 0.071 0.057 0.060 0.077 0.059
Previous loan indicator 0.057 0.062 0.063 0.073 0.073
Ln [sales at closing] 0.399 0.341 0.361 0.538 0.397
Loan characteristics:
Ln [facility amount] 0.272 0.211 0.220 0.410 0.259
Maturity in months -3.70 -3.07 -3.18 -0.75 -3.11
Term loan indicator -0.063 -0.058 -0.059 -0.034 -0.049
% retained by lead arranger(s) -0.868 -0.626 -0.708 -1.722 -0.433
Spread on drawn funds (bps) -35.20 -26.97 -28.06 -15.82 -25.00
Loan default indicator -0.014 -0.012 -0.007 -0.0002 -0.005
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Table 6: E¤ect of Distance on Loan Share
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating the loan share taken by a lender in the
syndicate to the distance between the lender and the lead arranger. The dependent variable is the share of
the loan taken by the lender in percentage. The independent variable of interest is the distance between the
lender and the lead arranger in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable
based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-
digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include loan facility xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors
allowing for clustering by year are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient is signicantly
di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
% taken by a syndicate member SIC SIC SIC Zip
Distance from lead arranger -1.748
(0.1646)
-1.985
(0.1425)
-2.079
(0.1373)
-2.284
(0.1626)
-1.800
(0.1380)
Previous relationships with lead 0.0001
(0.00005)
0.0001
(0.00004)
0.0001
(0.00004)
0.0001
(0.00004)
0.0001
(0.00003)
Previous relationships with borrower 0.177
(0.0156)
0.174
(0.0158)
0.173
(0.0160)
0.173
(0.0157)
0.174
(0.0156)
Market share, previous year 10.269
(0.5802)
9.921
(0.5932)
9.822
(0.6046)
9.677
(0.6178)
10.025
(0.6254)
N = 159,605 159,605 159,605 159,608 159,549
Adjusted R2 0.8244 0.8248 0.8249 0.8255 0.8245
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Table 7: E¤ect of Distance on Loan Pricing
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the lender distance at
the syndicated loan facility level. The dependent variable is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds
measured in basis points in all panels. The independent variable of interest is the lender distance of the
loan, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the
previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-
digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively.
All regressions include year, loan purpose, interest rate type, and borrower 2-digit SIC industry xed e¤ects.
Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates
that the estimated coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and ***
at the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
Spread on drawn funds (bps) SIC SIC SIC Zip
Lender distance 38.560
(5.2876)
29.016
(5.7544)
32.185
(6.2112)
-8.700
(5.6138)
21.773
(5.7166)
Private borrower indicator 5.460
(3.6374)
5.519
(3.6572)
5.474
(3.6580)
6.103
(3.6385)
5.499
(3.6491)
Public, unrated borrower indicator -22.197
(2.9414)
-22.257
(2.9669)
-22.251
(2.9651)
-21.975
(2.9972)
-22.306
(2.9867)
S&P investment-grade indicator -58.800
(3.7791)
-58.911
(3.7737)
-58.939
(3.7704)
-58.777
(3.7677)
-58.986
(3.7699)
Ln [1 + # previous loans by borrower] 0.731
(1.4006)
0.682
(1.3961)
0.717
(1.3957)
0.447
(1.3774)
0.691
(1.3927)
Ln [borrowers sales at closing] -6.515
(1.2113)
-6.570
(1.2103)
-6.540
(1.2087)
-6.796
(1.2094)
-6.578
(1.2081)
Ln [loan facility amount] -20.794
(1.1053)
-20.923
(1.1084)
-20.909
(1.1017)
-21.245
(1.1218)
-20.974
(1.1089)
Ln [loan maturity in days] 3.880
(2.0005)
4.046
(2.0030)
4.040
(2.0031)
4.194
(2.0042)
4.102
(1.9999)
Term loan indicator 71.144
(3.6660)
71.252
(3.6823)
71.203
(3.6893)
71.553
(3.6511)
71.362
(3.6781)
N = 36,402 36,402 36,402 36,402 36,401
Adjusted R2 0.5014 0.5007 0.5009 0.4999 0.5004
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Table 8: E¤ect of Distance on Loan Default
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating loan default to the lender distance at the
syndicated loan facility level. The dependent variable is the loan default indicator (0 if no default and 1 if
default). The independent variable of interest is the lender distance of the loan, which is the average distance
between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous year. Columns (I)-(V) use
distance as an independent variable based on lender specializations in 1-digit, 2-digit, and 3-digit borrower
SIC industry, borrower state, and 3-digit borrower zip code, respectively. All regressions include year, loan
purpose, interest rate type, and borrower 2-digit SIC industry xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors allowing
for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coe¢ cient
is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit State 3-digit
Loan default indicator SIC SIC SIC Zip
Lender distance 0.008
(0.0147)
0.001
(0.0143)
0.003
(0.0143)
-0.022
(0.0160)
-0.005
(0.0148)
Public, unrated borrower indicator -0.014
(0.0071)
-0.014
(0.0071)
-0.014
(0.0071)
-0.013
(0.0071)
-0.014
(0.0071)
S&P investment-grade indicator -0.036
(0.0088)
-0.036
(0.0088)
-0.036
(0.0088)
-0.036
(0.0088)
-0.036
(0.0088)
Ln [1 + # previous loans by borrower] 0.009
(0.0042)
0.009
(0.0042)
0.009
(0.0042)
0.009
(0.0042)
0.009
(0.0042)
Ln [borrowers sales at closing] 0.0003
(0.0020)
0.0003
(0.0020)
0.0003
(0.0019)
0.0001
(0.0019)
0.0002
(0.0019)
Ln [loan facility amount] -0.009
(0.0021)
-0.009
(0.0021)
-0.009
(0.0021)
-0.009
(0.0021)
-0.009
(0.0021)
Ln [loan maturity in days] 0.023
(0.0031)
0.023
(0.0031)
0.023
(0.0031)
0.023
(0.0031)
0.023
(0.0031)
Term loan indicator 0.028
(0.0047)
0.028
(0.0047)
0.028
(0.0047)
0.028
(0.0047)
0.028
(0.0047)
N = 27,078 27,078 27,078 27,078 27,078
Adjusted R2 0.0600 0.600 0.0600 0.0602 0.0600
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Table 9: E¤ect of Distance on Systemic Risk
This table reports coe¢ cient estimates from regressions relating a banks contribution to the systemic
risk of the nancial system (SRISK% ) to its interconnectedness in the syndicated loan market (distance).
The dependent variable, Ln [SRISK%], is the natural logarithm of SRISK%. The independent variable of
interest is the distance maintained by a lead arranger, which is the average distance on the loan facility level
for all the loans it arranged during the year. Distance used in this table is based on 1-digit borrower SIC
industry. European is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is headquartered in Europe. Distance 
European is the interaction term of Distance and European. Ln [leverage] is the natural logarithm of the
quasi-market leverage ratio calculated as (book assets - book value of equity + market value of equity) as a
percentage of market value of equity. Ln [market value] is the natural logarithm of market value of equity.
All regressions include year-quarter xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that
the estimated coe¢ cient is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at
the 1% level.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Between Between
Ln [SRISK%] OLS OLS OLS OLS E¤ects OLS E¤ects
Distance -2.778
(0.112)
-2.924
(0.112)
-3.439
(0.184)
-3.549
(0.164)
-3.836
(0.911)
-1.996
(0.087)
-2.279
(0.68)
European 0.407
(0.038)
0.876
(0.092)
0.485
(0.082)
0.053
(0.696)
Distance  European 0.685
(0.115)
0.873
(0.106)
0.646
(0.999)
Ln [leverage] 0.972
(0.039)
1.604
(0.365)
1.171
(0.03)
1.218
(0.23)
Ln [market value] 0.704
(0.02)
0.662
(0.128)
N = 3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492 3,492
R2 / Overall R2 0.1594 0.1790 0.1845 0.3265 0.3021 0.4930 0.7325
Between R2 0.5852 0.4775
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